Revise False imprisonment for Cambridge 9084 (4.3.3)

False imprisonment is an intentional or reckless tort against the person, defined as the unlawful imposition of constraint on another's freedom of movement from a particular place. It is actionable per se, meaning the claimant does not need to prove they have suffered any actual damage or loss. The tort protects an individual's fundamental right to liberty. The key elements that a claimant must establish are: first, that there was a complete restraint of their movement; and second, that this restraint was without lawful justification. The act of restraint must be a positive act, not a mere omission (unless there is a duty to act), and the defendant must have intended the act that resulted in the confinement. The duration of the imprisonment, however short, is immaterial to liability, although it will be relevant when assessing damages.

For false imprisonment to be established, the restraint on the claimant's freedom of movement must be total. A partial obstruction or the prevention of movement in one direction only is not sufficient. The classic authority for this principle is Bird v Jones (1845), where the claimant was prevented from walking on a specific part of Hammersmith Bridge but was free to leave the enclosure and cross the bridge by another route. The court held this was not false imprisonment as his movement was not completely restricted. The restraint must be within a boundary drawn by the defendant. This boundary need not be physical; it can be created by an assertion of authority where the claimant submits to the defendant's control. If a means of escape exists, it must be a reasonable one; an escape route that is dangerous, unknown to the claimant, or requires them to risk injury will not negate a claim.

A person can be falsely imprisoned without being aware of the restraint at the time. In Meering v Grahame-White Aviation (1920), the claimant was asked to wait in an office, unaware that two guards were stationed outside to prevent him from leaving. He was held to have been falsely imprisoned. This principle was later confirmed by the House of Lords in Murray v Ministry of Defence (1988). Lord Griffiths stated that 'The law attaches supreme importance to the liberty of the individual and if he is restrained by a threat of force, it is false imprisonment.' While awareness is not essential for liability, a claimant who is unaware of the detention is likely to receive only nominal damages. The defendant must have intended the act of restraint, though they need not have intended to act unlawfully.

Even if total restraint is proven, a defendant will not be liable if they can show lawful justification. The most common justification is a lawful arrest. For citizens (like a shopkeeper), the power of arrest is found in s.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). This allows a citizen to arrest someone who is in the act of committing, or whom they have reasonable grounds for suspecting to be in the act of committing, an indictable offence. For past offences, the citizen must have reasonable grounds for believing an indictable offence has been committed and that the person they are arresting is guilty. Crucially, the arrest is only lawful if it appears not to be reasonably practicable for a constable to make the arrest instead, and the arrest is necessary to prevent certain consequences (e.g., the person causing physical injury or making off). Any detention must be reasonable and for the purpose of handing the person over to the police as soon as is practicable.

Another justification is consent. If a person willingly enters a place where there are reasonable conditions for exit, they are considered to have consented to the restraint. In Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd (1910), a man had to pay a penny to exit a ferry wharf, a condition he was aware of. This was held not to be false imprisonment. Similarly, in Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Co (1915), a miner who demanded to be brought to the surface before his shift ended was not falsely imprisoned by the delay.

The primary remedy for false imprisonment is an award of damages. These are intended to compensate the claimant for the loss of liberty and any associated harm. A claimant can also seek a writ of habeas corpus, a court order which requires the detainer to present the claimant to the court to determine if the detention is lawful. If unlawful, the court will order the claimant's immediate release. Damages are categorised as follows:

• General Damages: Awarded for the loss of liberty itself. The amount depends on the duration of the imprisonment. The Court of Appeal in Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] set a guideline tariff, suggesting around £500 for the first hour, with a reducing scale for subsequent hours. These figures are adjusted for inflation.
• Aggravated Damages: These may be awarded in addition to general damages if the circumstances of the imprisonment were particularly humiliating or insulting, causing injury to the claimant's feelings and dignity.
• Exemplary (or Punitive) Damages: These are rare and are intended to punish the defendant for oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional conduct, particularly by state agents.
• Special Damages: These cover any specific, quantifiable financial losses resulting from the imprisonment, such as loss of earnings.