Revise Handling stolen goods as defined in s22 Theft Act 1968 for Cambridge 9084 (2.2.5)

The actus reus of handling stolen goods, as defined by s22(1) of the Theft Act 1968, involves three core components. Firstly, there must be 'handling'. This is a broad term encompassing various actions: receiving the goods, or undertaking or assisting in their retention, removal, disposal, or realisation. Secondly, the subject matter must be 'goods', which includes money and all other property except land, though it can include things severed from land. Thirdly, and crucially, the goods must be 'stolen' at the time of handling. Section 24(4) clarifies that goods are considered stolen if they are the product of any theft, blackmail, or fraud. The act of handling must occur 'otherwise than in the course of the stealing', meaning the handler is typically a different person from the original thief.

The conduct element of handling requires a closer look at the specific actions. 'Receiving' is the most straightforward, meaning to take possession or control of the stolen goods. The other forms of handling involve 'undertaking or assisting in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation'. This could be anything from storing stolen items for a friend (retention) to selling them on (disposal). A critical element of these latter forms of handling is that the act must be done 'by or for the benefit of another person'. This means a defendant cannot be guilty of assisting in their own retention of goods they have stolen. As established in R v Kanwar, even an omission can suffice for 'assisting', for example, by failing to disclose the location of stolen goods to the police to help the thief.

The primary mens rea element for handling is that the defendant must act 'knowing or believing' the goods to be stolen. 'Knowing' implies absolute certainty and can be inferred if a defendant wilfully shuts their eyes to the obvious. 'Believing' is a lower threshold but is more than mere suspicion. The case of R v Hall (1985) is the leading authority, stating that 'believing' is the state of mind of a person who says to themselves, 'I cannot say I know for certain that these goods are stolen, but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the circumstances'. Therefore, if a defendant only suspects the goods might be stolen, the mens rea is not met (R v Grainge). The jury must be satisfied that the defendant was effectively convinced of the goods' stolen nature.

In addition to knowing or believing, the prosecution must also prove the defendant acted dishonestly. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos, the test for dishonesty is objective. The court asks: (1) what was the defendant's actual knowledge or belief as to the facts, and (2) based on that, was their conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary, decent people? Furthermore, a person cannot handle stolen goods if they have ceased to be stolen. Under s24(3) of the Theft Act 1968, goods cease to be stolen once they have been restored to the person from whom they were stolen or have come into other lawful possession or custody. In AG's Reference (No. 1 of 1974), goods were considered to be in lawful custody after being seized by police, so the defendant who handled them afterwards was not guilty.