Revise Private nuisance for Cambridge 9084 (4.2.2)

Private nuisance is an indirect and unreasonable interference with a person's use or enjoyment of their land. The core definition, often cited from Winfield & Jolowicz, is an 'unlawful interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it', such as an easement. In this context, 'unlawful' means 'unreasonable'. A crucial preliminary issue is 'locus standi' – who has the right to sue. The foundational rule, confirmed by the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997), is that a claimant must have a legal or proprietary interest in the land affected. This includes owners and tenants, but excludes mere licensees such as family members or lodgers. This requirement, which overruled the more lenient approach in Khorasandjian v Bush, prevents the tort from becoming a remedy for personal discomfort disconnected from land rights.

The central element of private nuisance is proving that the defendant's interference was unreasonable. This is not a scientific test but a balancing exercise performed by the court, weighing the claimant's right to quiet enjoyment against the defendant's right to use their own property. This is the principle of 'reasonable user', based on the idea of 'give and take' between neighbours as described in Bamford v Turnley. To strike this balance, courts consider several factors. These include the character of the locality (Sturges v Bridgman - 'what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey'), the duration and frequency of the interference, the utility of the defendant's conduct (though public benefit is not a defence), any malice on the part of the defendant (Christie v Davey), and the sensitivity of the claimant (Robinson v Kilvert). No single factor is decisive.

Interference in private nuisance falls into two main categories. First, physical damage to the claimant's land, such as vibrations causing cracks, acidic fumes killing plants, or flooding. As established in St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping (1865), where tangible physical damage occurs, the locality of the area is irrelevant; the interference will almost always be considered unreasonable. The second category is intangible 'amenity nuisance', which affects the claimant's enjoyment of their land through things like noise (e.g., from a factory or motorsport track), smells (e.g., from a pig farm), or dust and smoke. For amenity nuisance, the locality principle is paramount. The defendant is usually the creator of the nuisance, but an occupier can also be liable for a nuisance they 'adopt' or 'continue', even if created by a third party or natural causes, if they fail to take reasonable steps to abate it (Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan, Goldman v Hargrave).

Once a prima facie case of nuisance is established, the defendant may raise several defences. The most effective is statutory authority, where an Act of Parliament authorises the activity causing the nuisance. Another defence is prescription, which applies if the nuisance has been actionable for 20 years without complaint by the claimant. It is important to note what is not a defence: 'coming to the nuisance' (i.e., the claimant moved to the area) is no defence, as confirmed in Miller v Jackson. The primary remedy is an injunction, a court order to stop or restrict the nuisance. However, the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence (2014) emphasised that damages can be awarded instead of an injunction, particularly where the public interest is a factor or the harm is minor. Another remedy is 'abatement' (self-help), where a claimant takes reasonable steps to stop the nuisance themselves. Finally, the Human Rights Act 1998, particularly Article 8, can inform the court's balancing exercise (Dennis v Ministry of Defence).