Revise Rylands v Fletcher for Cambridge 9084 (4.2.3)

The tort of Rylands v Fletcher originated from the 1868 case of the same name. The defendant mill owner employed independent contractors to build a reservoir on his land. The contractors negligently failed to block off disused mine shafts, and when the reservoir was filled, water flooded the claimant's adjoining mine. The defendant was held liable despite not being negligent himself. Blackburn J, in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, established the rule: 'a person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.' This created a form of strict liability, distinct from negligence and nuisance.

When the case reached the House of Lords, Lord Cairns upheld the decision but added a crucial limiting element: the defendant's use of the land must be a 'non-natural use'. This requirement has been a key battleground in subsequent cases. The meaning was clarified in Rickards v Lothian (1913), where it was defined as 'some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.' The modern interpretation, from the House of Lords in Transco plc v Stockport MBC (2003), is that the use must be 'extraordinary and unusual'. Therefore, a domestic water supply is a natural use, but storing vast quantities of industrial chemicals may be non-natural.

For liability to arise, there must be an 'escape' of the dangerous thing. An escape is defined as the thing moving from a place under the defendant's control to a place outside their control. In Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd (1947), a munitions inspector was injured by an explosion within the factory where she was working. Her claim failed because the explosion was contained within the defendant's premises; there was no escape. A further crucial development came in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather (1994). The House of Lords held that while the tort remains one of strict liability for the escape, the type of damage caused must be reasonably foreseeable. This introduced a principle of remoteness of damage, aligning the tort with nuisance and negligence. Consequently, only damage to land and property is recoverable. Claims for personal injury are not permitted under this tort (Transco), and pure economic loss is also not recoverable. Furthermore, to bring a claim, the claimant must have a proprietary or possessory interest in the land affected, as confirmed in Transco, aligning the standing requirement with that of private nuisance established in Hunter v Canary Wharf.

Even if all elements are proven, a defendant may avoid liability by successfully raising a defence. These include:

• Act of God: The escape was caused by an extreme and unforeseeable natural event that no human foresight could provide against. In Nichols v Marsland (1876), exceptionally heavy rain caused artificial lakes to flood, which was deemed an Act of God. However, this defence is rarely successful today; in Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway (1917), the court held that extreme weather that is not unprecedented in the region does not count.
• Act of a Stranger: The escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a third party over whom the defendant had no control. In Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd (1956), the defendant was not liable when a child threw a lit match into a petrol tank, causing an explosion. The act must be unforeseeable; if the defendant should have anticipated the third party's action, the defence will fail.
• Consent of the Claimant (volenti non fit injuria): The claimant expressly or impliedly consented to the accumulation of the substance. This often applies where the substance is kept for the common benefit of both claimant and defendant, such as a water tank for a block of flats.
• Statutory Authority: A complete defence where the defendant's actions are authorised by an Act of Parliament. The defendant must show the escape was an inevitable consequence of the authorised activity.
• Default of the Claimant / Contributory Negligence: If the claimant's own actions caused or contributed to the damage, this can be a full or partial defence. Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, damages may be reduced to reflect the claimant's share of responsibility.

The House of Lords' decision in Transco plc v Stockport MBC (2003) is the leading modern authority and significantly clarified, and narrowed, the scope of the rule. Lord Bingham stated that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher should be seen as a 'sub-species of nuisance' rather than an independent tort. The case involved a leak from a large water pipe supplying a block of flats, which caused a gas main to be left unsupported, creating a serious risk. The claim failed because the provision of a domestic water supply, even in large quantities, was deemed an 'ordinary' and not a 'non-natural' use of land. The court confirmed that the test for non-natural use is whether it is 'extraordinary and unusual' considering the time and place. This decision has made successful claims under Rylands v Fletcher much rarer, as many industrial activities are now considered 'ordinary'. The tort's relationship with negligence has also become closer since Cambridge Water introduced the foreseeability of damage requirement, blurring the lines between strict liability and fault.